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Health Sector Collective Bargaining and the Employment 
Contracts Act: A Case Study of Nurses 
Sarah Oxenbridge* 
This case study describes and analyses the negotiation of a collective employment contract 
between an ar~ea health board management and regional representatives of the New 
Zealand Nurses Association during the first set of negotiations conducted under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. The study found that, contrary to claims by the Act's 
proponents, the Act does not lead to improved co-operation and communication between 
employers and employees. However, a high level of communication and co-operation was 
evident in the employee-union relationship, and it was found that certain provisions of the 
Employment ~Contracts Act afford employees greater power to determine their conditions 
of employment. 
Introduction 
The ~central aim of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 is, in the words of its long title, "to 
promote an efficient labour market" (ECA, 1991 ). Additional stated aims of the Act ,are 
premised on three key themes: freedom of association, fr~eedorn of representation and 
freedom of contract. These explicit objectives are accompanied by implicit aims. On the 
introduction of the Act, unionists accused the legislation's architects of having a hidden 
• 
agenda - the lowering of wages, particularly penal rates, and the exclusion of unions from 
the employment relationship. Meanwhile, the Act's supporters srressed the opportunities 
for individualism, communication and co-operation that the legislation promoted, and 
emphasised the newfound freedom for individual workers to detennine their employment 
conditions. Member of Parliament and Chair of the Labour Select Committee Max 
Bradford ( 1991: 1 7) stated that the Act had resulted in "unlimited opportunity for employers 
and employees to shape arrangements in their own workplaces". The Act's leading 
proponent, the Minister of Labour Bill Birch, stated that the new legislation "'signals a move 
from the old conflict industrial relations model to a new, co-operative relationship between 
employers and ~employees" (Birch, 1991: 7). Similarly, Brook ( 1991: 8) contrasted New 
Zealand's previous industrial relations system "based on a view of employment relationships 
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as inherently adversarial or exploitative" with the new system in which 
relationships are a matter of mutual benefit to employers and workers, and for this 
are fundamentally co-operative". However, the Act's critics • t'lblt dais 
of the employment relationship is deficient, as it ignores the imbalance in 
the parties to a contract (Douglas, 1991; Harbridge, 1993; Scott, 1991). ftftft.-A•• to die 
rhetoric surrounding the Act's introduction, the main aim of the legislation is to 
mut11al co-operation between employers and employees, resulting in u•tp~ 
in the negotiation process and power to dete1anine wages and conditions. However9 
opponents argue that the Act promotes employment relationships where the opposite is the 
reality, as it tilts the balance of power in favour of employers and provides them with new 
freedoms to reduce wages and conditions of employment. 
Less than six months after its introduction, the Employers Federation's labour 
manager claimed that "improved workplace communication and flexibility bad the 
Act's most notable success" as "staff and management were now able to talk to each other 
in ways not possible under a confrontational system" (Christchurch Press, 17/12191: 3). 
Similarly, the Federation's chief executive stated that the move to a system 
of labour relations was accelerating with "markedly less conflict than had 
predicted" (Marshall, 1992). However, three years on from its introduction, conflicting 
views exist as to the extent of the Act's success in promoting closer workplace relationships 
between employers and employees. As Hughes (1992) notes, the frequent reporting of 
lockouts does little to support claims by the government and pressure groups that the 
Employment Contracts Act is about co-operation rather than confrontation. Similarly, the 
Department of Labour's recent survey of labour market adjustment under the ECA found 
that many employees were uncomfortable with the new environment of 
Labour, 1993). The survey reported that employees' views on the extent of itnp:ovenaents 
in staff/management co-operation and communication and employee trust of 
were significantly different and less favourable than employers'. Among public sector 
employees for example, 45% felt that employee trust of mamgement had decreased over 
the last year, while 27% believed that co-operation between management and 
had decreased. In addition, case studies and reports of labour relations in the poat-ECA 
environment in the retail industry (Hammond, 1993; National Distribution Unioa, 1992), 
the private and public health sectors (Hill and Du Plessis, 1993; New ZeaJIIIII 
Organisation, 1993), and a number of service industries (Gosche, 1992), have 
the tendency for employers to unilaterally deterntine wages and conditions without 
into bargaining with employees or their representatives. Moreover, a number of these 
studies draw attention to increasing levels of worker exploitation and of conflict 
employees and employers. 
The purpose of the present study is to examine the process of collective bargaining In tight 
of the predictions of the Act's supporters and opponents. A series of propositions 
on these predictions were developed and tested in the context of collective e•nployment 
contract negotiations between Canterbury Area Health Board (CAHB) manaa and 
New Zealand Nurses Association (NZNA) regional organisers and which took 
place between May and November 1992. The case study J,tethod of was in 
which data from personal interviews, observation of the negotiation ~ and 
documentary sources was collected and analysed through content analysis. · 
interviews were conducted with NZNA regional organisers and the CAHB's indutrial 
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relations manager prior to and following the negotiation period. Eight of the ten days of 
contract negotiations were observed, as were two stopwork meetings where both parties 
addressed nursing staff. During adjournments, observation of the NZNA team took place 
in order to record interactions between team members. In addition, a number of 
documentary sources were examined. These inclucted newspaper and magazine articles, 
information bulletins distributed to members by the NZNA Canterbury branch and union 
central office, and miscellaneous documents such as CAHB memoranda to employees and 
memoranda between the negotiating parties. 
Prior to setting out results, the paper will provide a brief overview of the research 
propositions and the context within which the negotiations took place. The research 
findings are presented in two parts; the first is a descriptive summary of the negotiation 
process, the second involves an analysis of the negotiation or bargaining processes in light 
of the research propositions. 
Research propositions 
Four research propositions were developed in order to test certain pr~edictions regarding the 
outcomes of the new legislation in the context of a set of collective employment contract 
negotiations. These are: first, that the ECA will lead to significant changes in the 
bargaining process; second, that employers will use the Act to achieve the "implicit" aims 
identified by its critics; third, that the Act will not provide employees with greater power 
to detennine their own employment conditions; and finally, that the Act will not lead to 
improved co-operation and communication between employers and employees. 
In the period leading up to the Act's passage, it became evident that the only prediction that 
was consistently made by both critics and supporters of the new legislation was that the 
process of negotiating wages and conditions would change markedly. Consequently, the 
first proposition tests whether the collective bargaining process has changed, and if so, for 
what reasons. The second proposition posits that employers will use the legislation 
primarily to achieve the Act's "implicit aims", particularly the reduction of wages and 
conditions and the exclusion of unions from the employment relationship. The third 
proposition predicts that due to the inher~ent power imbalance between negotiating parties, 
the Act will not result in greater power for employees to deterrnine their employment 
conditions. Finally, while the Act's supporters praise the Act as a means of fostering 
communication and co-operation between employers and employees, opponents point to 
the emergence of a "conflict model" of industrial relations (Foulkes, 1992: 12). Thus, a 
fourth proposition tests whether the Act will lead to improved communication and co-
operation between employees and employers. 
Health sector reform in New Zealand 
In 1983, the Area Health Boards Act devolved public health activities previously carried 
out by the Department of Health to the regions, marking the beginning of the 
"rationalisation and regionalisation" of health funding and provision (Ashton, 1992: 149). 
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Under this Act, a "global cap" was put on hospital budgets tiJreuall 
population-based funding fottnula for allocating resources to the 
1988 on, individual health boards were required to 
criteria with the Government. These initiatives were expected to 
resource use within the boards, who were operating with · 
funding. 
Perhaps the most significant change to New Zealand's public IU8r 
shift from a traditional public sector adminisbative function towards a 
orientation. The rise of managerialism within the health sector bas led to 
private sector management practices and a prevailing culture based on tile 
quality patient care. In tum, a new culture cenbed around cost-cuaias 
quantification of perfottnance and output has emerged, provoking opposiuoa 
sector employees. Summing up the situation in New Zealand's pubHc 
(1992: 28) stated "all around the country there is a very deep-seated 
management". As a result, a number of commentators have argued that the health 
refornts of the last decade have led to a working environment in the puhtic beab1a 
in which low employee morale, high stress and dissatisfaction prevail ( Cs11npbeD, 1 
1992; Coddington, 1990). 
Health sector collective bargaining 
Prior to the Act's final passage in May [991, most of the state 
agreements were rolled over, remaining in force until 30 June 1992. 
bargaining round begun on the 1st of July 1992 was the first full public 
round to be conducted under the Employment Contracts Act. 
In late March 1992, the Ministers of Health and State Services met with 
general managers. Stressing the tight fiscal environment for the round, their 
managers centred on the negotiation of separate collective employment co 
of the 14 area health boards, greater flexibility in working hours, and ... ,. ,.. ... 
rates (Luke, 1992). The Ministers' directives reflected the Government's desire 
bargaining refortns in the public sector which would parallel private 
particularly the decentralisation of bargaining from national to enterprise or 
documents and the reductions in penal rates. The use of the Employment Co 
achieve these outcomes was favoured because the Government, as paymaster of 
health board workers, desired a reduction in State labour costs (Luke, 1992). A 7 
deficit was claimed as making reductions in state sector spending imperatiye. 
I I '. 'f ; : ' ' : 
directives met with a hostile reaction from health sector unions, who 
of "declaring war" on their members (Roth, 1992). The stage was set for what 
potentially a major confrontation. 
ce 
to 
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The negotiations - a summary 
On the first day of the CAHB negotiations, the employers tabled their claim and engaged 
in an opening address outlining the "unique set of circumstances" under which they were 
bargaining. Future health refonns, decreased funding, the Employment Contracts Act, and 
the flexibility achieved by private sector employers in the area of penal rates were all 
referred to. Consequently, the CAHB' s claim sought to achieve flexibility through 
reductions in penal and overtime payments and changes to working hours. In contrast, the 
NZNA claim retained current conditions of employment and sought a three percent wage 
rise. Additionally, the NZNA outlined a key element of its claim -the notion of workplace 
refonn - as an alternative strategy to cost-cutting. The union advocate asserted that 
workplace reforrn would lead to improved service quality through the revision of work 
practices. Initially, the Board rejected the proposal, later accepting the notion and jointly 
fonnulating a memorandum of understanding with the NZNA which outlined both parties' 
commitment to the concept. 
After four days of negotiations, joint stopwork meetings were held. Negotiations had 
reached a deadlock, and both parties wished to address the nursing staff to outline their 
respective positions. After presenting their claims, the two parties gave an overview of the 
negotiation process to date. Nurses expressed extreme anger towards management and 
members unanimously rejected the Board's proposed wage cuts. Talks resumed on day five 
with the NZNA stating that the anger displayed by members at the stopwork meetings 
served to reinforc·e their original strategy. However, the CAHB responded with a package 
which involved greater pay cuts than packages previously offered. In turn, the NZNA 
developed a package in which lump-sum "shift allowances" replaced penal rates, similar to 
packages developed by NZNA regional representatives during negotiations with 
neighbouring area health boards. In response, the CAHB offered a settlement which 
substantially lowered NZNA's proposed shift allowances. 
Day six of negotiations followed the same course. Each side calculated and recalculated 
base rates and shift allowances (with increases in the base rate resulting in reduced shift 
allowances) in order to arrive at a package that the other party would find satisfactory. The 
NZNA fonnulated settlements that were close to "cost-neutral" (where the nursing budget 
was retained at its present level), while the CAHB tabled settlements proposing reductions 
in the nursing budget. The CAHB announced that they would not accept a cost-neutral 
settlement, and a mutual adjournment was agreed upon. On day eight the NZNA presented 
the CAHB with a roll-over of the expired award, giving away only one concession. 
Surprisingly, the CAHB responded positively, offering a package which the NZNA 
considered "more attractive" than any package offered yet. Both sides gradually started 
moving towards a settlement and offers back and forth resulted in agreement, with the 
employers meeting all union claims apart from slight reductions in penal rates. The parties 
arrived at a settlement they believed would be ratified, and stopwork meetings were held 
in order for members to ratify the contract. To both parties' surprise, the ballot showed 
overwhelming evidence of members' dissatisfaction with the offer; of I ,400 nurses who 
voted, 1 , 1 00 rejected the proposed settlement. 
Foil owing the breakdown in negotiations, nurses were balloted on their intention to strike. 
• 
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The ballot resulted in 80 to 90 percent of all vetiaa ill 
Combined strikes were planned for five days in total, in which S,SOO 
area health boards were to take industrial action simultaMOusly. 
Taranaki Area Health Board, on the day before the first 
Area Health board applied for an interim injunction · the NZNA.. 
filed on the grounds that the association had not complied with 
and given proper strike notice, and its strike ballot bad 
injunction failed and nurses took strike action over two of the five days fJf 
Three sets of inforn1al talks were held by the parties on the days prior to 
strike action. The frrst two days of talks failed to reach wllile 1118 
more productive and led to discussion of the issues to be resolved in the filll 
negotiation. Prior to final negotiations the NZNA developed a ia 
rates were refotinulated as shift allowances and were calculated as an hourly 
to ordinary time based on a nurse's grading. These hourly rates Ul&.l 
allowances originally proposed by the NZNA, which were bunp S'IIU 
varied by shift. They also differed from the previous system of • 
not proportionately related to the basic hourly rate in the way that penal -
proposal met with the CAHB' s acceptance, and negotiations proceeded 
Consequently, the fmal two days of negotiations followed the same 
negotiations prior to the breakdown, in which both teams calcnlated 
financial data in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory package. 
The final settlement maintained the nursing budget at its current level (a 
settlement) with all monetary changes in penal rates channelled into a~'* 
1.8 percent. During fmal negotiations the board had modified its 
moving away from a position of seeking a $3.4 miJJion saving, to being 
a cost-neutral agreement. The industrial relations manager explained that 
was because the negotiation period "was taking too long", and bcca11se "1be 
further strikes was not favourable". The settlement was fully ratified 1JJ 
stopwork meetings and the two parties began drafting the employment 
Discussion 
The negotiation process was analysed in light of the propositions outJird 
findings structured according to these four propositions. Thus, the first 
the extent to which bargaining processes have changed under the BCA, 
examines whether the CAHB used the Act to lower wages and exclude 
employment relationship. The third section investigates whether nur.a' 
their employment conditions has been enhanced by the legislation, while 
proposition that the Act led to improved communication and · 
management and nursing staff. 
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to charge nurses. However, whereas in award negotiations NZNA bargaining teams were 
composed of union officials with experience in negotiations, regional bargaining resulted 
in the involvement of teams of delegates who had little negotiating experience. Both the 
union advocate and CAHB' s industrial relations manager believed that this resulted in 
negotiations proceeding more slowly than in the past. However, the union advocate 
believed that delegate representation on the team was essential, as the delegates provided 
feedback at all stages of the process by gauging workplace opinion on proposed settlements 
and bargaining options. Delegates surveyed the workforce to assess the outcomes of 
ratification ballots, and measured the effects of the Board's proposals on the "average 
nurse" by calculating the impact of proposals on their pay packets. 
Thus, it was found that the Employment Contracts Act has resulted in significant changes 
in the collective bargaining process. The Act's emphasis on the decentralisation of 
bargaining to the enterprise, or in this case, regional level, was evident in the present study. 
In addition, new ratification procedure requirements and the composition of the union 
bargaining team resulted in the negotiation process proceeding more slowly, and in a more 
uncertain manner, than previously. 
Use of the Act to achieve its implicit aims 
This study found that although to some extent the employer party was able to achieve those 
aims highlighted by the Act's critics (reductions in wage costs - particularly penal rates -
and the exclusion of unions from the employment relationship), the final settlement was 
highly favourable for employees and the NZNA. Although the employer sought to exclude 
the NZNA as a party to the contract and reduce nurses' wages, it had little success in 
achieving either aim. 
The central focus of the negotiation process was the restructuring of payment systems to 
match similar refonns in the private sector. Consequently, throughout negotiations the 
CAHB frequently compared the public health sector with private sector industries, in order 
to justify the proposed wage cuts central to their claim. board management repeatedly 
emphasised the "social change" taking place throughout New Zealand, maintaining that New 
Zealand was becoming a "Monday to Sunday society". The board's argument in favour of 
reducing penal rates was based on comparisons between the health sector and the retail 
sector. The board's advocate likened hospital operations to those of retail outlets. He 
argued that nurses were not exempt from changes taking place in other sectors of the 
economy, in particular the shift towards greater wage flexibility and changes to working 
hours, and asserted that such sentiments were widespread public opinion. The NZNA 
refuted the board's comparison between the health and retail sectors, highlighting the crucial 
differences between them. The union advocate argued that there was little basis for 
comparison, owing to the fact that customers for health services differ markedly from 
customers for consumer goods, and that hospitals are highly dissimilar to retail outlets as 
they operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The union advocate observed that it was the 
employer's freedom to negotiate penal rates downward that was the significant issue. 
Consequently, the board's proposal to reduce penal rates quickly became a sticking point 
in negotiations. By the conclusion of negotiations, the shift allowances eventually agreed 
upon were almost equivalent to the penal rates set out in the fonner award, and 
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consequently few nurses experienced wage losses. However, these modifications to the 
payment structure fulfilled the Minister of State Services' directives, retaining penal rates 
by recalculating and renaming them. It is interesting to note that it was the union party who 
actively developed the new wage structure which finally met with the board's agreement. 
It seems that the union realised that if negotiations were to proceed further, the one barrier 
to be broken down was the Government's "ideological opposition" (Macfie, 1992: 24) to 
penal rates. 
The CAHB' s bargaining strategy centred around lowering penal rates and increasing base 
rates. Such a strategy provides management with the opportunity to create divisions 
between workers who work primarily penal hours and those who work ordinary hours by 
encouraging those who work weekday (nine to five) shifts to sign contracts containing high 
base rate increases. This results in a situation where such workers lose sight of the gains 
to be made from a unified stance and consequently, collective strength is reduced. NZNA 
bulletins to members stated: 
NZNA supports Monday to Friday workers and their need for an increaw: in the base rate. 
However this increase cannot come from fellow workers as a decrease in their wages is 
unacceptable to them. NZNA will continue to fight for more money for all nurses. 
(NZNA Pay Negotiations, Bulletin 1 0) 
The union team avoided confronting the difficult issue of whether the existing wage 
structure was fair, instead justifying the higher wages paid to weekend and night workers 
by constant references to the "unsociable hours" worked by these employees, and 
demanding wage increases for all nurses. 
During negotiations the composition of the NZNA bargaining team led to the emergence 
of a division between delegates who worked weekend/night shifts, and those who were 
Monday to Friday workers. Whereas the advocate and the delegates who worked ordinary 
hours saw strike action as a "last resort", the weekend workers repeatedly advocated strike 
action. Throughout the negotiations, these team members constantly reminded the group 
of the central focus of the NZNA's bargaining strategy; that members had mandated that 
they would not take a cut in wages. It became evident that the delegates who were 
weekend/night workers had significantly more at stake than the other team members and 
were anxious to preserve their current wages and conditions. Team members wished to 
ensure that neither group ofNZNA members was disadvantaged by the final settlement, yet 
each had a vested interest in ensuring that there would be no reduction in their individual 
incomes. Thus, it became increasingly hard for negotiators to bargain for the status quo as 
"dollars and cents" issues began to dominate negotiations. The composition of nurses' pay 
packets (the proportion of penal hours and nonnal hours worked) varied widely, and 
consequently negotiators found it difficult to estimate the effects of proposals on individual 
nurses' pay packets to any degree of precision. The union team requested that the CAHB 
provide them with financial infottnation including projections of wage costs, breakdowns 
of total wage expenditure (into penal rates and ordinary hours), and infonnation on the 
proportions of workers working ordinary and penal hours. However the CAHB was 
reluctant to divulge such infonnation. Consequently., union negotiators were unable to 
assess the validity of "ability to pay" arguments put forward by the board, and were also 
hampered in their efforts to develop a proposal which would not unfairly advantage one 
group of workers over another. 
The Act's opponents maintain that the 
among employers, who fail to 
such as skills development, 
included in the NZNA 's IJr 
proposal, and its reluetmee to aacept that 
validates such critici•ns of the Act. The 
not part of negotiations . . . ow empllaala 
consultation with employees are outside thla 
· supporters' assettions that the Act would 
and co-operation between and 
of workplace issues could be addressed 
implicit aim of reducing wage costs 
while longer-te1m initiatives were exeluded 
The CAHB sought to weaken •mion infbJeDM Ill 
the NZNA as a party to the contract and from the 
the CAHB' s acceptance of the concept of 
union was the employees' bargaining agent, 
the employee and union), while the NZNA 
representative, emphasising NZNA invol'¥ 
industrial areas. It is interesting to note that 
employers and others, the ECA makes no mentiaa of 
representatives. Furthmmore, the CAHB tbat 
to consult with each other and no other tbinl 
would impede communication between the pliDVJtf 
union advocate emphasised the benefits to the ....... , ... 
such as the NZNA, noting that the alternative Will 
workers, or engaging in contract negotiations with a 
In this study, the employer sought to negotiate waae 
rates, in line with similar bends in the private 
initially insistent that it had to make a four to 
alternative is jobs", the final settlement · t1a1t 
employer was unable to use the ECA to achieve 
Similarly, while the board sought to exclude 
trying to exclude them from the workplace retbDa 
contract, the union gained inclusion in both 
employee representative. 
Employee power to detel'lllille 
The contract negotiations between the two palties 
employees and their representatives. Initiall)', t1ut 
stance, threatening substantial reductiODs ill tile 
negotiations, the employees had all but 
their prior expectations. A number of 
favourable settlement that was reached. n... 
Health Sector Bargaioing 27 
in negotiating the contract (as CAHB negotiators were bargaining with. multiple 
occupational groups simultaneously), effective strike action, the high degree of umty ~~ng 
the region's nurses (and hence the decreased likelihood of fragmented bargmmng 
arrangements emerging), and the fact that the employers' represenatives, in the opinion of 
the NZNA advocate, "were not as aggressive as they could have been". It was 
acknowledged by both parties that nurses were a powerful occupational group in tertns of 
both the group's size, and the level of public sympathy they engendered. 
Employee power to detern1ine employment conditions was enhanced by the Act's 
ratification procedures, which provided individual workers with the opportunity to 
detettnine bargaining outcomes. The ratification process enabled employees to calculate 
the effects of proposals on their wages and vote accordingly. Employees' rejection of a 
paclulge that had met with the approval of both negotiating teams showed that the 
ratification process had the potential to result in a situation whereby employee power to 
dictate the course and outcomes of negotiations overrode that of the union negotiators. 
However, in some instances ratification procedures can lead to unsatisfactory outcomes for 
certain employees in minority groups. ·As a result of the ratification of a proposed 
settlement by the majority of employees during 1992 contract negotiations between the 
NZNA and the Otago/Southland Area Health board some nurses received pay cuts of up 
to $10,000 per year. Many nurses in the region were extremely dissatisfied with this 
outcome. Consequently, the nature of the ratification process means that union members 
who constitute a "minority" within a larger group of workers will often fmd their power to 
detennine their employment conditions reduced. Moreover, although the ratification process 
afforded employees greater power to detettnine their working conditions, it also placed 
restrictions on their representatives (as outlined earlier). 
Decentralised bargaining led to variations in employee power between regions, as nurses 
in some regions were more willing to strike and were more unified than those in others. 
The ECA provides employers with the opportunity to use a "divide and rule" strategy, thus 
reducing employee power by fragmenting the workforce. Employers may encourage a 
climate of self-interest among workers by offering one group of employees a contract that 
they consider attractive, but which reduces the conditions of another group (or by 
approaching workers directly without the knowledge of their bargaining representative), 
resulting in a divided workforce. However, unity among nurses in the Canterbury region 
prevented CAHB management from pursuing such outcomes. Furthettnore, the 
Employment Court's rejection of the board's application for an interim injunction to prevent 
strike action marked an important turning point in negotiations. The granting of the right 
for nurses to strike and the subsequent strike action itself signalled a swing in bargaining 
power towards the employees and their representatives. Successful strike action provided 
tangible evidence of the strength of unity between the region's nurses. The NZNA 
advocate stated that in tettns of bargaining power and resolve to strike, nurses in Canterbury 
were a lot stronger than nurses nationwide. 
However, certain groups of workers were rendered powerless in detettnining their own 
employment condi~io~s.. During the course of negotiations the CAHB began employing 
new employees ~~ Individual employment contracts containing significantly less favourable 
wages_ and con~1t1ons than those of the existing workforce. In addition, casual nursing staff 
were 1ssued With new employment contracts containing substantially reduced wages and 
28 Sarah Oxenbridge 
conditions, and were told by management that if they did not sign the contracts by a certain 
date they would be given no further work. The wages and conditions in both sets of 
contracts were based on the board's claim. The actions of CAHB management served to 
hasten the bargaining process somewhat, as the bargaining team were aware of the 
vulnerability of both groups of workers. These workers were highly reliant on a settlement 
by the negotiating parties in order to restore their wages and conditions to their previous 
level in the case of casual workers, and to bring about parity between the wages of new 
employees and existing staff. Hence, the union was aware of the fact that the longer it took 
to settle the contract, the longer these workers would be working under infeaior conditions. 
Although casual and new employees were eventually brought under the new contract 
settled, they were essentially powerless to determine their own conditions of work during 
the negotiation process. 
This study found that in some respects, employee power to dete1n•ine employment 
conditions has increased, true to the rhetoric surrounding the Act's introduction. The Act's 
ratification procedures enabled individual workers to deteitnine bargaining outcomes 
through majority vote, and the high level of unity among the nurses · their 
collective power to dictate the course of negotiations. However, certain groups of workers 
who constitute a minority of the total nursing workforce may fmd that the ratification 
process actually obstructs them from influencing negotiation outcomes. In addition, the 
study found that vulnerable groups of workers such as casual and new employees were 
unable to detettnine employment conditions during the negotiation process. 
Employee-employer communication and co-operation 
Contrary to the predictions of the Act's supporters, this study found that communication and 
co-operation between employees and the employer deteriorated dwing negotiations. 1bis 
finding verified the proposition that the Act would not lead to increased comm•mication and 
co-operation between the two parties. Meanwhile, high levels of communication and co-
operation between the NZNA and its members were apparent, as evidenced by high levels 
of member involvement and participation in the formation of the bargaining sbategy, 
stopwork meetings and strikes, and support for the negotiating team. 
While morale was low among the nursing workforce prior to the contract negotiations, 
employer-employee relations deteriorated further dwing the bargaining process. The 
negotiation process and in particular the stopwork meetings and strike, served to intensify 
and consolidate nurses' anger and provide a direction for its outlet. Stopwork in 
particular provided ample evidence of nurses' anger towards CAHB manage•nent The 
meetings provided a means by which nurses were able to vent their anger and frustration, 
and it seemed that the nursing staff considered them a vital means of communicating such 
feelings to management. Managers were heckled and booed loudly while addressing staff, 
and individual nurses challenged management on its position and outlined how much they 
stood to lose under the board's proposed cuts. Employees highlighted the inequity in 
compensation between managers and nurses, criticising managers for imposing wage cuts 
upon medical staff while being exempt from wage cuts themselves. Thus, during 
negotiations employer-employee relations worsened, as the stopwork meetings fuelled the 
nurses' anger and strengthened their resolve. Proponents of the Act advocate that direct 
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communication between employees and employers (previously hindered by the intervention 
of unions) serves to strengthen the relationship between the primary parties to the 
employment contract. However, this study shows that in some instances direct 
communication may in fact aggravate tensions between employees and employers. 
As with the stopwork meetings, it became evident that the strike also served as a vehicle 
for the expression of nurses' anger. Ostensibly, workers were striking over the preservation 
of their employment conditions. However, it became clear from interviews with union 
organisers and NZNA team members, and officials' and members' statements to the press, 
that they were also striking over the health reforrns of recent years and all that they have 
entailed: conflict between management and health professionals, the axing of essential 
services, the lack of consultation with nursing staff, and the subsequent detrimental effects 
on patient care. Indeed, the union advocate stated that nurses' anger was such that nurses 
in a nearby region would hav~e taken strike action "even if they had got a rollover". The 
strike served as a means of venting anger and displaying unity, while ~enabling the union 
to assert its bargaining power. 
The NZNA team members communicated nurses' dissatisfaction to management and to the 
central union office. While award negotiations had excluded the direct input of nurses at 
a regional level, the present negotiations enabled workplace representatives to express their 
anger and frustration. In defense of penal rates, the delegates forcefully conveyed to the 
CAHB team the dysfunctional consequences of working penal hours. One delegate stated, 
"Your health suffers when you work nights. You don't get to see your family. I'm unwell 
because l'v~e worked the last seven afternoon duties" (3pm to llpm). To which a fellow 
delegate added "This is what nurses are saying and it is fundamental to them". The 
decentralisation of bargaining improved the opportunities for ~employees to directly 
communicate with management, although it did not appear to improve co-operation between 
the parties. 
Improved employer-employee communication may result if workplace refortn is 
implemented within CAHB hospitals. However, the Act sets up constraints on 
implementing any such refonns due to health sector contract negotiations proceeding on a 
yearly basis, in line with the "hard budgets" set by management. The Act requires 
negotiating parties to ~expend substantial time and financial resources on preparing for 
yearly contract negotiations, resources that might otherwise be invested in developing 
initiatives such as workplace r~efonn. Moreover, although CAHB management recognised 
the need for a mechanism to improve communication between management and employees, 
such a mechanism was not initiated by management, but by the union. Thus, contrary to 
the assertions of the Act's supporters that the new legislation will result in improved 
communication and co-operation between employees and employers, the relationship 
deteriorated over the negotiation period, to the point where nurses engaged in industrial 
action. However, as mentioned previously, nurses took industrial action due to a 
combination of factors, and ~consequently it is not possible to conclude that industrial action 
was taken solely on the basis of dissatisfaction with changes brought about by the 
Employment Contracts Act. 
While the relationship between the CAHB and its employees deteriorated over the course 
of negotiations, it became apparent that the relationship between the union and its members 
.. 
30 Sanla 
was sllengtbened. The NZNA made 
union national office aad hers. aad to 
sought meaabership involven1ent at ev.-y 
the development of its · 
info1anation on negotiations as they 
by delegates in the workplace. Meanbers 
the union by communicating their views 
Moreover, fi:om early in the pre-negotiation 
workers of their rights under the Act. The 
members and led them to identify more 
sbengtbening of the employee-union 
conbasted with the · and · 11_,1 
where groups of workers fo1med splinter giD1Ipl ..a 
employers. 
The new indusbial relations environment C0111d be 
territory" for public sector unions such as the NZNA 
bargaining round under the Act However, NZNA 
created by the Act well in advance of the neg~ 
the ratification process, balloting procedures, ani•• 
interim injunction. Boxall & Haynes (1992) 
organisation efforts are effective, who alloca18 ..., 
then1selves in enterprise issues beyond the baditioaal 
been less affected by the Employment Contracts Act te 
High levels of on-site organisation (aided by the 
highly-trained and committed delegates, and the 
issues has resulted in a unified, powerful and 
contributed to union success in negotiations. 
In direct contrast to predictions that the Act would. W a. 
employers and employees, in this study eanployee eaaplaJ 
course of negotiations, with stopwork · 
apparent that increasing levels of conflict bet\YCI'D 
identify more closely with the union, which offered ~· 
of employment. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to document and 
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study focused on a controversial sector, one in 
relations issues were intertwined, making for a highly 
It can be concluded that in this case bargaining 
under the Act. This is due to a combination of 
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decentralised bargaining structures, and bargaining team compositions. Employee power 
to dete11nine employment conditions was enhanced for the majority of workers due to 
employee input in the ratification of contracts and bargaining teams, while certain minority 
groups of workers were unable to influence employment conditions. It was found that the 
Act does not foster communication and co-operation between employees and employers; 
rather, the opposite is more likely to occur. Consequently, low levels of communication 
and co-operation between employees and employers united union members, and 
stlengthened the employee-union relationship. In te11ns of the employer's use of the Act 
to achieve its implicit aims, ideological opposition to the notion of penal rates led to the 
development of a changed payment structure. 
When asked to predict how trade unions would respond to the new industrial relations 
environment resulting from the ECA, Douglas (1991: 18) answered "Unevenly, in an 
evolutionary manner, on the basis of conflict and relative strength and in a changing way 
as events and experiences unfold". In the present study both parties had no alternative but 
to proceed in an evolutionary manner, as their course through the bargaining process was 
marked with hurdles and pitfalls set up by the new legislation. The parties learned by 
experience as they progressed through the negotiation process, in a similar manner to the 
bargaining parties in Walsh & Fougere's study of the frrst round of health sector bargaining 
under the Stat~e Sector Act (1988). In their study, Walsh & Fougere (1989: 220) note that 
although the State Sector Act was conceived as an empowering agent for management... in 
other unexpected and unintended ways it also empower~ed unions and hobbled 
management". A strikingly similar outcome was evident in this case study, as the union 
was empowered by certain provisions in the new legislation and by its members' 
cohesiveness. This study chronicles the impact of a changed institutional environment on 
the interactions between participants involved in the process of negotiating a collective 
en1ployment contract. It is hoped that this case study of bargaining under the Employment 
Contracts Act, essentially exploratory in character, lays a foundation for future case studies 
of contract negotiations in the health sector and in other sectors. 
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